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Abstract 
In this article we identify the unfolding unintended consequences which flow from 
one instance of policy layering in Australia’s National Disability Scheme (NDIS).  
We show how use of a causal diagram, which highlights feedback loops and emergent 
properties, to map complex chains of causal factors can assist policy scholars and 
policy practitioners to understand both the likely direction of change and possible 
responses.  In the case of Australia’s National  Disability Scheme, our analysis 
suggests that the likely direction of change will work against two of the fundamental 
design features of the NDIS: providing participants with more choice and control, and 
ensuring all eligible Australians are able to access appropriate services and supports 
regardless of where they live.  Our analysis points to the use of price regulation as the 
site of potential intervention because of the role it plays in subsequent feedback loops 
and the development of the two, unwelcome, emergent properties.   
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Introduction 
Launched in 2013, the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) has taken 
Australia from a block-funded approach to disability service delivery to a 
personalised approach, where individuals purchase services from a disability services 
market (Needham and Dickinson 2017).  To implement the scheme, new institutional 
entities and governance arrangements were created.  These include a set of scheme 
actuaries to model costs and set prices for the disability market place, a new 
implementation agency, the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA) which is 
co-owned by the Commonwealth and State and Territory governments, and more 
recently, the establishment of a new market regulator for the disability sector 
(Department of Social Services 2016; Productivity Commission 2017).  While new 
institutions and new institutional arrangements have been created, policy layering has 
also been a feature of implementation of the NDIS (Carey et al. 2017).  In this article 
we look more closely at the unfolding unintended and unanticipated consequences of 
layering.  By broadening the scope of the complex, causal pathways that may be 
triggered by policy layering, we offer prudential warning to policy-makers about 
relying on markets in disability services.  For policy scholars we show how 
identifying and mapping the complex interactions between state and non-state actors 
can assist in understanding both the likely direction of change and possible responses 
by uncovering the connections between instrument mixes, implementation levers and 
system-wide change.  
 
For policy practitioners involved in complex policy reform which takes place over a 
number of years, the ability to elaborate causal chains is important because layering, 
sought out as a tool to handle institutional complexity, can cause feedback loops 
which have the potential to be uncontrollable once set in motion (Carey et al. 2017: 
16).  Being able to identify the precise dynamic causes that lead to unintended 
consequences (either of policy layering, or those that trigger further policy layering) 
means that those involved in implementing complex policy reforms are able to 
identify where they need to intervene in order to ameliorate unintended negative 
consequences generated by processes of layering or triggering further policy layering.      
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Understanding the mechanisms of change 
Policy layering refers to the process by which new policy goals are added to existing 
rules or policy commitments without removing existing rules or commitments 
(Béland	2007;	Jacobs	and	Weaver	2015).	 The concept of layering was developed 
within institutionalist theory in response to a first generation of historical 
institutionalism judged as over-emphasising positive feedback processes and the 
sensitivity of institutional development to small effects at origin, but under-
emphasising the subsequent opportunity for endogenous change in the process of 
institutional reproduction over time.  Policy layering is a form of endogenous change 
where actors can make use of institutions, either individually or in novel 
combinations, to introduce innovations.  The concept of layering accepts path 
dependent logic, but allows actors to introduce gradual within-system change, which 
eventually may be transformative.  
 
Endogenous change requires a richer account of causation than simple analysis of 
institutional change that relies on identified external shocks as the deus ex machina 
driver.  In reviewing Mahoney and Thelen’s co-edited book, Explaining Institutional 
Change, van der Heijden (2010: 239) noted that a focus on the causal chains of 
variables was needed to better understand underlying mechanisms that explain 
observed institutional change.  We argue that employing the concept of layering 
requires greater attention than is currently paid in the literature to making the structure 
and content of causal relations and flows explicit through time.  Layering comprises a 
complex, causal pathway of endogenous institutional change and is not simply a one-
shot choice by policy-makers at a given point in time.   
 
Because Mahoney and Thelen (2010: 8) conceptualise institutions as “distributional 
instruments (emphasis in original) laden with power implications”, for Mahoney and 
Thelen, change occurs as actors with different endowments of resources seek to 
modify existing institutions or create different kinds of institutions.  Mahoney and 
Thelen’s (2010: 15) framework for identifying and explaining different types of 
institutional change postulates that characteristics of the institution and the political 
context influence the type of dominant change agent that may emerge and the kind of 
strategies the dominant change agent may use to effect change.   
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In addition to rendering agency subordinate to structure, Mahoney and Thelen’s 
model has attracted criticism because of its static nature (that is, the four types of 
institutional change are seen as separate and distinct), whereas empirical studies 
identify different types of change occurring sequentially, which has led some scholars 
to argue that the distinct types of change identified by Mahoney and Thelen are better 
understood as transitional stages rather than a final outcome (van der Heijden and 
Kuhlmann 2017: 544).  While change agents may deliberately use a combination of 
strategies to effect change, this contradicts the causal relationships identified by 
Mahoney and Thelen “who uniquely assign contexts and agents to an individual mode 
of change” (van der Heijden and Kuhlmann 2017: 545).  Furthermore, the outcome of 
a combination of strategies may not be the same as the outcome when the same 
strategies are used separately (Shpaizman 2014: 1040).  For example, in analyzing 
Israeli immigration policy, Shpaizman (2014: 1050) found that the combination of 
conversion through layering led to an expansion of institutional aims rather than the 
replacement of existing goals with new ones as suggested by Mahoney and Thelen 
(2010: 18).   
 
Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010) framework for explaining institutional change has also 
attracted criticism on the grounds that it lacks explanatory power because it does not 
account for the content of change, nor its direction (Shpaizman 2014: 1040).  For 
example, in their analysis of the EU budget system, Ackrill and Kay (2006: 130) 
describe a process of layering new meso level institutions into the existing macro 
level framework which, contrary to Mahoney and Thelen’s conception of layering as 
“changing the ways in which the original rules structure behaviour” (2010: 16), had 
the effect of preserving and strengthening the existing macro level framework.  
 
In discussing future research agendas in the field of institutional change, Hall (2010: 
220) predicted that “the greatest advances will be made by those willing to borrow 
concepts and formulations from multiple schools of thought”.  The following 
subsection introduces two concepts, feedback loops and emergent properties, which 
we argue are useful in identifying and cataloguing the complex causal chains 
operating at the micro-level that underpin layering as an institutional dynamic 
observed at the meso-level.    
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Feedback loops and emergent properties 
Systems thinking is a branch of complexity theory that attempts to map and analyse 
the systemic causes that contribute to a given situation (Meadows and Wright 2008).  
We suggest that systems thinking may be useful to both academics and policy-makers 
for the analysis of the process and implications of policy layering because of the 
assumptions systems thinking makes about causal processes and agency, in particular 
the concepts of feedback and emergent properties to explain endogenous change.  
This way of thinking about causal processes and agency offers an alternative to the 
structure and agency debate that is perennial in the historical institutionalist literature 
(Hay and Wincott 1998: 953; Cairney 2012).  While historical institutionalists agree 
on the importance of policy legacies and other kinds of historical constraints when 
explaining policy change, they disagree on the extent to which structure (institutions, 
patterns of behaviour) or agency (individual preferences and actions) determine 
outcomes (Rayner 2009: 84; Capano 2009: 16).  For strong institutionalists, structure 
generally trumps agency, whereas weaker forms of institutionalism emphasise agency 
and the complexity of institutional structures which may contain internal 
contradictions that, over time, create opportunities for agents to modify existing 
institutional structures, or create new ones (Rayner 2009: 89).  Causal diagrams offer 
a way to capture both the agent based and structural conditions that give rise to policy 
effects (emergent properties).  
 
Both systems thinking and complexity theory have a long lineage in public policy and 
the institutionalist literature (Tenbensel 2018; Geyer and Cairney 2015).  Systems 
thinking and complexity theory have evolved alongside the study of institutions, and 
one of the earliest introductions of systems thinking to political science can be found 
in Easton’s (1953) critique of the state of political science and his emphasis on the 
importance of the emergent effects from institutional structures, alongside the usual 
consideration of agents and their political strategies.  While systems thinking is, at 
times, presented as a ‘fix-all’ solution, best practice sees the judicious application of 
systems thinking alongside existing theory to organise and analyse information about 
complex and dynamic policy phenomena (Carey et al. 2015: 6).  Applications of 
complexity theory to policy issues include insight into migrant children education 
(Lui 2015), the interconnections between traffic congestion and health (Newell 2015), 
tree coverage and health (Brown et al. 2018), and violent crime in Brazil (Lehmann 
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2015).  These case study applications show the advantages of using the key concepts 
of complexity theory to understand institutional change.  For Tenbensel (2018) the 
most significant contribution that complexity theory can make to public management 
and policy literature lies in the ‘theoretical partnerships’ with more established public 
management and policy theories, such as historical institutionalism.  For example, 
Tenbensel (2018) combines the notion of population genetics with the HMNC 
(hierarchy, market, network community) framework popularized by authors such as 
Bovaird (2008) and Rhodes (1996).  In doing so, Tenbensel (2018) uses key concepts 
from population genetics to argue that complexity theory helps to highlight the 
endogenous processes that give rise to institutional change.  Similarly, in this article, 
we are using key concepts from systems thinking in theoretical partnership with 
historical institutionalism to better understand the processes involved in endogenous 
institutional change (policy layering), and the likely unintended consequences.   
 
In the remainder of this article we illustrate how two concepts from complexity 
theory, feedback loops and emergent properties, may extend understandings about the 
process and implications of policy layering that occur during the implementation of 
complex social policies.  Within systems thinking, a branch of complexity theory, the 
concept of ‘feedback’ refers to a circular chain of causal factors that acts to reinforce 
or perpetuate each other (Meadows and Wright 2008).  The existence of a circular 
chain of causal factors means that one factor can trigger a string of causal connections 
that can either reinforce or perpetuate the original factor: the change ‘feeds back’ into 
itself (Dyball and Newell 2015).  A commonly used example of a reinforcing 
feedback process is a bush fire.  As the fire burns it dries out the leaf litter around it 
making it more likely that this leaf litter will catch alight, which spreads the fire and 
causes even more leaf litter to dry out and catch alight.   In the political context, an 
example of a reinforcing feedback process occurs when there is a ‘run’ on the banks.  
As financial stability in one or two banks diminishes, bank users become fearful and 
withdraw their funds from other, previously unaffected banks, causing the financial 
stability of the whole banking system to be affected.  The concept of feedback helps 
us to understand how multiple decisions by different actors, which might all have 
been made in isolation and with the best intentions for the success of a policy or 
program, can work together to reinforce certain processes that have unintended 
consequences for desired policy outcomes.  Over time, these multiple decisions can 
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produce a feedback process that drastically changes the outcomes (or ‘emergent 
properties’) of a given system or set of policies. 
 
The concept of ‘emergent properties’ refers to a characteristic or ‘property’ that is 
found across the system but which individual parts of the system do not themselves 
hold (Meadows and Wright 2008).  As Cairney (2012: 348) explains, locations of 
control (centralised or de-centralised) are important when considering emergent 
properties because emergent properties result “from the interaction between elements 
at a local level rather than central direction”.   Climate change is a common example 
of an emergent property as it is felt across the globe, yet no particular carbon-emitting 
object (for example, cars, livestock or industrial complexes) ‘holds’ climate change or 
controls its direction.  It is the accumulation of many carbon emitting decisions that 
leads to the emergent property of climate change.  When considering systems thinking 
in the context of policy studies, the characteristic of emergence focuses our analytic 
attention on the rules of the system (Cairney 2012), and the ways in which these rules 
give rise to ‘emergent properties’ or outcomes that have no single root cause or 
centralised directive force (Dyball and Newell 2015).  This makes emergent 
properties difficult to influence as they result from a series of patterns within the 
system that have no central point of origin or control, and thus no root cause in either 
structure or agency, but in the interactions between both (Dyball and Newell 2015).   
 
Methods  
This paper draws on data from the first two years of a four year study of the 
implementation of the NDIS (UNSW Human Ethics Grant number G160892).  The 
study aims to investigate implementation with a particular focus on how governance 
structures develop and change over time.  The study utilizes a case study research 
design because it enables us to investigate these changes in-depth and in their real-life 
contexts (Yin 2014).  Specifically, this paper draws on 33 semi-structured interviews 
conducted with senior public servants who played a role in determining the 
governance structures of the NDIS after relevant legislation was passed.  We began 
with a purposive sampling of key individuals in charge of an initial NDIS 
implementation group established within the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet.  This was followed by interviews with senior public servants from a range of 
policy and program areas (Governance and Stakeholder Relationships, Policy and 
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Legislation, NDIS Transition, NDIS Quality and Safeguards, NDIS Financial Policy 
and Performance, Financial Modeling, Budget Development, Market Oversight, 
Market Reform, Disability Employment and Carers, and Mental Health) within the 
Commonwealth Department of Social Services (DSS), the department charged with 
overseeing and co-ordinating the implementation of the NDIS at the national level.   
 
The first round of interviews took place in March/April 2016.  Themes covered in the 
first round of interviews included: decisions regarding the governance structure of the 
NDIS, deviations from the structure proposed by the Productivity Commission in its 
report, Disability care and support, and the impact of the newly elected LNP 
Government on the design and implementation of the NDIS.  The second round of 
interviews took place in April/May 2017 and focused on the interrelated issues of 
market development, regulation and accountability.   
 
Data from the interviews with senior public servants were supplemented with data 
drawn from interviews with CEOs or senior managers from eight agencies providing 
disability support services to individuals living in the Australian Capital Territory 
(ACT).  The service provider interviews focused on the impact of the NDIS pricing 
structure on their organisation and took place from September-December 2016.  In 
addition, interview data was supplemented by information contained in recently 
published reports.  
 
Data was analysed using a thematic approach (Blaikie 2010).   ‘Like’ data were 
grouped together to form categories and subcategories. These categories were 
developed into more substantive themes by linking and drawing connections between 
initial categories and hypothesizing about consequences and likely explanation for the 
appearance of certain phenomena (Strauss 1987).  This was done through discussion 
between the team.  In the refining of themes for publication, selective coding was 
carried out, whereby transcripts were revisited with the explicit intent of finding 
further linkages and connections between the central issue being explored and other 
themes.     
 
The systems diagram, also known as a causal diagram, was developed using 
researcher-defined variables based on the thematic analysis, with the substantive 
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themes and connections established in accordance with Meadows and Wright (2008).  
This diagram tells the same narrative as the interviews, but is presented in a form that 
conceptually and visually highlights the causal impacts of one instance of policy 
layering.  As noted earlier, policy layering occurs when new policy goals are 
introduced whilst retaining existing rules or policy commitments.  The NDIS 
introduced a new policy goal, more choice and control for participants, which means 
participants are able to choose their service providers as well as being involved in 
decision making around the sort of supports they require.  However, existing 
commitments (existing State and Territory government contracts) were retained and 
participants are required to use service providers funded under these existing contracts 
until the contracts expire.  In this article we do not present a full systems analysis but 
instead present the causal diagram as an illustrative example of the way in which the 
concept of causation found in systems thinking and complexity theory may be useful 
for thinking through the impacts of policy layering.   
 
The National Disability Insurance Scheme 
The National Disability Insurance Act 2013 came into effect on 1 July 2013, 
establishing the framework for the National Disability Insurance Scheme and a new 
independent statutory agency, the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA) to 
implement the Scheme, initially in four trial sites in regional NSW and Victoria, in 
South Australia and Tasmania.  On 1 July 2014, a further three trial sites commenced 
in Western Australia, the Northern Territory and the ACT.  National roll-out of the 
Scheme commenced on 1 July 2016 (the transition phase), with the goal of increasing 
enrolments in the Scheme from 20,000 individuals to 460,000 individuals by 2019, by 
which time it was anticipated that enrolment of all eligible individuals would be 
complete (Buckmaster and Clark 2018).    
 
Prior to the introduction of the NDIS most disability support services were provided 
under State or Territory government programs where service delivery organisations 
received block grants and the organisation made decisions about how that block of 
money would be spent.  Consequently, the type and extent of services available to 
people with disability varied depending on where they lived.  The architects of the 
NDIS wanted to provide all eligible Australians with a consistent level of support 
regardless of where they lived (Productivity Commission 2011).   
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I think the intent is that we’ll by and large have national consistency…in decision making 
around the Scheme and what people are able to access (Senior public servant P2).  
Under the old State or Territory government programs, people with disability had 
little or no choice about what services they received or who provided those services.  
For this reason, another fundamental design principle was ‘more choice and control’ 
for participants (Nevile et al. 2018: 1295).   
 
In its report, Disability care and support, the Productivity Commission described 
existing State and Territory programs as “underfunded, unfair, fragmented, and 
inefficient…[giving] people with disability little choice and no certainty of access to 
appropriate supports” (Productivity Commission 2011: 2).  In an attempt to provide 
certainty of access to appropriate supports, the NDIS was designed as an insurance 
based scheme where eligible participants are given funding packages determined by 
their level of need and self-defined goals, with the continuation of  individual funding 
packages not tied to time limited contracts or annual appropriation cycles.  For this 
reason, the financial sustainability of the Scheme is vitally important.   
One of the things that really struck me is how much of that budgeting and finance function 
drives an awful lot of what happens…because the overall success of the NDIS is very  
dependent on its financial viability (Senior public servant P6).  
 
While the NDIS is a nationally based scheme, funding and governance is shared 
between Commonwealth, State and Territory governments.  The COAG Standing 
Council on Disability Reform is the decision maker on NDIS policy issues and 
consists of Commonwealth, State and Territory ministers responsible for disability.  
The NDIA Board reports to the Standing Council on Disability Reform.  In broad 
terms, the NDIA is responsible for day-to-day implementation of the Scheme.  For 
example, the NDIA holds all funds contributed by the Commonwealth, State and 
Territory governments in a single pool, administers enrolments in the Scheme and 
approves the payment of individual support packages.  The NDIA also sets prices 
which determine the level of funding allocated to NDIS participants to purchase 
reasonable and necessary supports.  However, participants who choose to manage 
their own funding package, or employ someone to manage their funding package on 
their behalf, are able to purchase services directly from service providers at a price 
determined by the service provider.  Funding for participants who don’t want to self-
manage, or are unable to self-manage, is managed by the NDIA and subject to NDIA 
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price controls. The Commonwealth Department of Social Services (DSS) is 
responsible for overseeing and co-ordinating the implementation of the NDIS at the 
national level.   
 
Causal processes in the NDIS 
Because funding and governance of the NDIS is shared between Commonwealth, 
State and Territory governments, the introduction and gradual roll-out of the NDIS 
required a series of bilateral agreements between the State and Territory governments 
and the Commonwealth government.  The Scheme’s tight implementation timeframe 
meant aspects of the Scheme were designed after national roll-out commenced.  
Consequently, “the design of the transition agreements was very State focused” 
(Senior public servant P16), with States using existing financial commitments to 
cover their agreed contribution to the NDIS (Senior public servant P18), thereby 
creating policy layering.  Thus, as part of the bilateral agreements, NDIS participants 
are required to use existing State and Territory funded services until existing contracts 
expire, rather than purchasing services from other providers operating in a disability 
services market (Carey et al. 2017).  The practice of directing participants to use 
existing State or Territory funded services is referred to by Commonwealth public 
servants as using ‘in-kind’ supports.  The requirement to use in-kind supports goes 
against the design principle of increasing choice and control for participants.  
So although we’re telling [participants] ‘you can go and get whatever provider you want’, 
actually [participants] have to use this [provider] first because otherwise we’ll run out of  
money (Senior public servant P6).   
Use of in-kind supports also constrains market development. Those responsible for 
oversight of NDIS implementation are well aware that, in the NDIS, increased choice 
for participants is dependent on market provision.   
[A]t the end of the day we need the market to be there.  I mean there is no choice and control 
for participants if there’s no services being delivered in a particular area, and the whole  
fundamental underpinning is ‘let’s improve choice and control’ (Senior public servant P2). 
In most cases, the price of existing government services is higher than the price 
determined by the NDIA actuary.  DSS is aware of the effect of these layered “legacy 
systems”, noting that “transitional cost issues can create expectations and precedents 
within the sector, both government and non-government, which can go on to create 
long-term [financial] pressures for the NDIS” (DSS 2017: 20).  
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In its submission to the Productivity Commission’s Study into National Disability 
Insurance Scheme Costs, DSS (2017: 7) argued that “in the short-term, the NDIA is 
best placed to continue setting prices for NDIS providers…[because] inflationary 
pressures could be placed on long-term Scheme sustainability if there is an absence of 
pricing signals from the NDIA as the market expands”.  Some in the Department 
believe price regulation may be necessary even after the development of a robust 
market, but acknowledge that 
[p]rice regulation is a tricky issue, especially if another provider is offering services at a 
slightly higher price and the participants want choice and control.  So you can see the more 
people self-manage, the more the Scheme will be vulnerable to price escalation (Senior public  
servant P28).  
The NDIA (2017: 5) argues that price controls are necessary when markets are not 
fully competitive and providers are able to set prices that are above the level that 
would occur in a competitive market.  
 
Used to a less restrictive, and possibly more generous, funding model, many existing 
service providers are finding it difficult to maintain the same level and quality of 
service provision.  For example, a recent report by Cortis et al. (2017: 54) concluded 
that NDIA “prices are incentivizing cost-cutting and creating imperatives for low 
quality provision…[because] pricing is predicated on under-classification of workers 
and insufficient time for workers and supervisors to do their jobs well”.  Service 
providers operating in the ACT agree.  
I think the whole pricing issue is really a huge elephant in the room for the NDIS...being able 
to continue to deliver that quality with the pricing structure is going to get more and more  
difficult (ACT service provider P7).   
We’ve got a pricing signal sent by the NDIA that is already pushing people back into 
communal living arrangements, and I think there is some risk in that (ACT service provider  
P5).  
In the Australian Capital Territory, the only State or Territory where the NDIS trial 
covered all age groups and types of disability, some service providers have responded 
to the new pricing structure by only providing services they believe are financially 
viable.  
We had a problem with the pricing initially, and we did the sums and went to the Board and 
said, ‘if we participate at that price…we’d lose over a million dollars in our first year…The 
price for skill development – that makes us just about break even with where our current  
funding is.  So we said, ‘we’ll only do skill development’ (ACT service provider P1).   
Other service providers responded to the NDIA pricing structure by making the 
decision not to work with NDIS participants whose funding package is managed 
through the NDIA. 
	 13	
In April 2016 we sent out a letter to tell all of our NDIS clients that we would only be able to 
continue to work with them if they were self-managed, or financially managed, because if we 
have to do stuff through the NDIA, the price is not sustainable…So for all our [self-managed] 
clients we say, ‘this is what we can deliver, for that amount of money’ (ACT service provider  
P8).  
In the above example, most of the agency’s existing clients chose to stay with the 
agency, “even if it meant an hour less service a week”, but in trying to find alternative 
providers for clients who did not want to self-manage, or could not afford to employ 
someone to manage their funding package, agency staff discovered 
there is a not a lot of choice out there in Canberra.  The market has shrunk…so there are a lot 
less options if you are [NDIA] managed.  Overall the number of registered providers has 
increased, but if you drill down into agencies that provide direct support, which is the thing 
that has the tightest cap on it, there are a lot less operating in that space (ACT service provider  
P8).  
Choice is further eroded when agencies stop providing a particular type of service 
altogether.  
Effectively what’s happened is that people…who have been with us for twenty years…say, 
‘we really want to go to [Agency name], and then the NDIA says, ‘you can’t go to [Agency  
name] because [they don’t provide that service anymore’] (ACT service provider P1).  
 
As agencies stop providing specific services, or restrict their clients to those who self-
manage, further pressure is put on the remaining providers who still work within the 
NDIA managed system: a workforce that is already under substantial pressure.  For 
example, in a recent survey of 1,500 disability support workers, 55.9 per cent strongly 
agreed or agreed with the statement, ‘under NDIS I don’t have enough time to do 
everything in my job’ and, as a result, were experiencing a high level of work 
intensity and unpaid overtime.  An even higher percentage of supervisors felt 
overstretched, with 64 per cent strongly agreeing or agreeing with the statement, 
‘under NDIS I can’t provide proper supervision due to lack of time’ (Cortis 2017: 21 
& 33).  
 
If the ACT experience is replicated across Australia as other jurisdictions move to full 
Scheme roll-out, there is significant risk of creating a bifurcated market consisting of 
a private market delivering higher quality services and a thin market within the NDIA 
managed system delivering lower quality services.  A bifurcated market in disability 
services is not a desired outcome as it is inconsistent with the Scheme’s fundamental 
design principle of national consistency.  
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As noted earlier, senior bureaucrats who have responsibility for overseeing the 
Scheme’s implementation are aware of the risk of unintended negative consequences, 
such as unequal access to quality services, because “you’re turning over inelastic 
demand over to the market and the market always exploits inelastic demand” (Senior 
public servant P30).   
We always knew that the transition [period] for the market was going to be a time of intense 
risk in terms of quality and safeguards, the appropriate provision of services, and escalation in  
prices (Senior public servant P28).   
Senior bureaucrats are also aware that, at times, they have to “do things that are 
outside of the [bilateral] agreements…[and as] good public administrators you’ve got 
to re-open those agreements and make judgement calls about whether it is worthwhile 
doing that and at what time” (Senior public servant P33).  However, in the case of a 
complex social reform where responsibility and accountability are spread over 
different levels of government, with new governance and regulatory institutions still 
evolving, questions of when to act, who acts (whose responsibility is market 
development?), and what actions should be taken are difficult to answer.  For 
example, when senior bureaucrats were asked who is responsible for market 
development, all responded by saying responsibility is shared between the 
Commonwealth government, State and Territory governments and the NDIA (Senior 
public servants P8; P10; P15; P27; P28; P30; P31; P32), with some indicating that 
they believed the new national regulator will also have some oversight responsibility 
for market development.1   
The response to a lot of things in the market will be what powers are available and their  
appropriate application by the regulator at some stage (Senior public servant P28). 
Senior bureaucrats involved in setting up the new national regulator noted that “the 
meta regulatory powers of competition belong to the [already existing] Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), but the ACCC has said to us that, 
in reality, they don’t have the resources to spend their time looking over the shoulder 
of the NDIS” (Senior public servant P15).  A national regulator, resembling the UK 
Care Quality Commission, which would be responsible for aged care and child care as 
well as a wide range of disability support services, would be a more efficient option, 
both for government and for providers who work across sectors, but a major 
impediment is timing.  
[H]ow do you get this thing in place in the timeframe?  As soon as you introduce a level of 
complex negotiations across portfolios and sectors, then immediately all your timelines go out 
the window.  So it is always going to be this very difficult kind of trade off for government  
around how it does these things (Senior public servant P15).   
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The question of what action(s) should be taken is also not straightforward, as 
measures taken to strengthen service quality, for example, have to potential to limit 
market development.   
I worry about the impost…that a Cert III or Cert IV can do to a market.  It’s a really important 
quality set up, but it also limits growth.  Mandating a certain qualification [for disability  
support workers] does limit growth (Senior public servant P29). 
 
Discussion 
The analysis of events unfolding in Australia illustrates Cairney’s (2013: 288-9) 
observation that “the issues of implementation are central to complexity theory” 
because, so often, the effects of particular decisions are contingent on a variety of 
factors, some of which may be difficult to identify.  However, causal loop diagrams 
which focus on feedback and emergent properties, allows researchers to clearly map 
the, often multiple, effects of a particular set of policy decisions.   
 
Figure 1  
 
 
Figure 1 is a causal diagram of the implications of one instance of policy layering in 
the NDIS.  It shows that multiple decisions made by different actors in the system, 
such as State and Territory governments, actuaries, the NDIA, service providers, care 
workers, people with disability and the Commonwealth Department of Social 
Services, accumulate to influence the opportunities participants have to exercise 
choice and equity of access to services.  In systems thinking terms, Figure 1 depicts a 
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number of feedback loops that act to reinforce or perpetuate aspects of the Scheme, 
most notably the level of market robustness.  In addition, the emergent properties that 
are of most concern are limits on the opportunities of participants to exercise choice 
and control, and equity of access to services.   
 
It needs to be noted that there are many other factors that also influence the emergent 
properties of the NDIS system that are not captured in Figure 1, the purpose of which 
is to show how one instance of policy layering affects choice, control and equity of 
access.  In Figure 1 we have included the factors that arose in our interviews and 
illustrate the ways in which a systems thinking approach can help to articulate the 
unintended consequences of policy layering.  Overall this diagram represents a theory 
of causal connections that flow from one instance of policy layering (Use of expensive 
State and Territory in-kind services), to the policy goals of the Scheme (Opportunity 
to exercise choice and control and Probability of unequal access to services).  
 
The easiest way to read Figure 1 is to start at the top left variable  (Use of expensive 
State and Territory in-kind services) and follow the arrows right towards the end loop 
which sets out the policy goals of the Scheme.  We begin with top left variable, Use of 
expensive State and Territory in-kind services, because this is a crucial example of 
policy layering.  The use of in-kind services increases the Cost to NDIS, which affects 
Scheme sustainability.  NDIA actuaries monitor Scheme sustainability (Degree of risk 
perceived by actuarial analysis) and set prices for services that are ‘efficient’ 
according to their actuarial models (‘Efficiency’ of pricing decisions).  However, if 
prices are set too low, this will cause Financial pressure on service providers, which 
can result in agencies choosing not to provide certain types of services or only 
providing services to NDIS participants who manage their own funding package 
(Instances of opt-out from NDIA managed system).   As the number of providers 
opting out of the NDIA managed system increases, this can lead to greater pressure on 
the remaining workforce (Number of workers in NDIS market), as well as  a lower 
Level of market robustness.  With greater pressure on the NDIS workforce, the Time 
and resources to do care work, may be reduced, resulting in a reduction in Quality of 
care outcomes for service users.  While this is occurring, a lower level of market 
robustness can lead to Instances of thin markets or market gaps where services are 
unavailable for purchase.  Declining levels of market robustness may by ameliorated 
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by Instances of block funding/provider of last resort actions undertaken by 
government.  Ultimately all of these different variables and points of decision making 
by actors in the Scheme can impact on the emergent properties; namely, Opportunity 
to exercise choice and control and equity of access to services for people with 
disability (Probability of unequal  access to services), both of which are central 
concerns of the NDIS.  
 
The possibility that the NDIS may not provide participants with more opportunities to 
exercise choice, and may not improve equity of access to services, represent the two 
greatest sociocultural and political risks associated with the NDIS.2   Complicating 
any government response to these sociocultural and political risks is the actuarial risk 
of the NDIS becoming financially unsustainable, with regulatory measures, such as 
price caps, introduced in order to mitigate this actuarial risk, but which, as shown in 
Figure 1, increase the likelihood of sociocultural and political risks.  The dilemma is 
clear: how to balance sociocultural, political and actuarial risk.  
 
Risk-based approaches to regulation involve separating out, analysing and managing 
discrete risks with the greatest attention directed at areas where problems are likely to 
have the greatest impact (Haines 2017: 189-90).  In the case of the NDIS, our analysis 
suggests that price regulation is the area that deserves the closest monitoring and 
attention because of the role it plays in feedback loops and the development of 
emergent properties.  In December 2016, the Commonwealth government finalised 
the NDIS Quality and Safeguarding Framework, a national framework, which will 
replace existing quality and safeguarding measures, many of which are embedded in 
individual State and Territory funding agreements.   The principles of proportionality 
and risk responsiveness underpin this piece of regulatory policy making which, 
among other things, aims to “respond to market failure risks with prudential 
monitoring for some segments of the market” (DSS 2016: 13).   
 
In 2013 the Institute for Government, an independent think tank in the UK, issued a 
report outlining the role of government in the development of robust public sector 
markets.  In particular, the report emphasised the need for governments to be 
constantly monitoring the ways in which the market is developing and how providers 
are responding to existing rules, assessing potential impacts and adjusting the ‘rules of 
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the game’ when potential risks are perceived as being too high (Gash et al. 2013: 19).  
The Institute for Government report also emphasised the need “for on-going, iterative 
and piecemeal adaptation” (Gash et al. 2013: 20).  Under the Quality and 
Safeguarding Framework, the NDIS registrar will be responsible for monitoring and 
reporting on the effectiveness of NDIS markets, including early indicators of thin 
markets and market failure (DSS 2016: 17).  However, as the Department of Social 
Security acknowledge, the Quality and Safeguarding Framework is a high-level 
policy document “with significant work still to be done on the implementation design 
and roll out of the Framework” (DSS 2016: 17).   Our analysis suggests that the risk 
of thin markets is not confined to rural and remote locations or services provided to a 
very specific client group.  If the Framework is to achieve the goal of mitigating the 
risks associated with thin markets and market failure, the NDIS registrar will have to 
work closely with the NDIA because assessments of market related risks depend upon 
information about the number of NDIS registered providers who are actually 
providing basic support services to NDIA managed participants, and the percentage of 
participants who have chosen to manage their own funding package, in each local 
area across Australia.   
 
Conclusion  
The work of Thelen and her co-authors has proved to be a useful lens for many 
scholars seeking to understand the process of endogenous institutional change (van 
der Heijden 2011: 15).  The concept of layering has received the most attention in 
empirical studies (van der Heijden and Kuhlmann 2017: 543), but useful though it is, 
the concept does not overcome perennial arguments over the relative importance of 
structure or agency in driving institutional change.  In particular, the concept of 
layering remains resolutely focused on institutions: endogeneity of layering remains 
limited to cases where exogenous events or shifts in the political context create spaces 
for forms of creative agency to lead change.  The possibility of bottom-up change - 
that agency may lead to observed layering without any perturbations in the broader 
institutional environment - is precluded.  
 
In this article we argue that use of a causal diagram which highlights feedback loops 
and emergent properties allows researchers to transcend debates about structure and 
agency that continue to bedevil new institutionalist approaches in social policy 
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because it allows for the existence of circular chains of causal factors that may be the 
result of both structure and agency.  For example, the requirement to use State and 
Territory funded services in preference to alternatives available in the market was 
driven by structure, whereas decisions by individual service providers to opt-out of 
the NDIA managed system are driven by consideration of their specific circumstances 
and preferences.  As shown in Figure 1, over time, the combination of a number of 
feedback processes can have a significant effect on policy outcomes.  The elaboration 
of causal chains also shows that decisions taken by individual actors are not made 
with the intent to harm the system.  Instead such decisions are distorted by feedback 
loops and result in unintended consequences, ultimately impacting on equal access 
and opportunities for choice.   
 
In the case of Australia’s National Disability Insurance Scheme, our analysis suggests 
that the likely direction of change will work against two of the fundamental design 
features of the NDIS; providing participants with more choice and control, and 
ensuring all eligible Australians are able to access appropriate services and supports 
regardless of where they live.  Our analysis also points to the use of price regulation 
(Degree of risk perceived by actuarial analyst and ‘Efficiency’ of pricing decisions), 
as the site of potential intervention, and hence the area that deserves the closest 
monitoring, because of the role price regulation plays in subsequent feedback loops 
and the development of the two, unwelcome, emergent properties.   
 
While our analysis focused on a single case, the potential for emergent properties 
exists within any complex policymaking system.  Even when policy practitioners are 
aware of possible unintended consequences, they may still choose to add new rules 
without removing existing rules and commitments because doing so allows them to 
manage more immediate implementation goals, such as finalizing transition 
agreements with State and Territory governments.  However, using a causal diagram 
to map complex causal chains, assists policy practitioners to understand the likely 
direction of change and possible responses, thereby allowing them to take action 
which will ameliorate risks associated with any unwelcome emergent properties.  
 
 
Endnotes 
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1.  At the time the second round of interviews were conducted, DSS had released a 
report setting out the regulatory framework, had developed draft legislation, the 
Expenditure Review Committee of Cabinet had approved the establishment of a new 
national regulator (the NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission), although this 
decision had yet to go through the budget process.  The NDIS Quality and Safeguards 
Commission commenced operation in NSW and South Australia on 1 July 2018 and 
will commence operation in Victoria, Queensland, Tasmania, the ACT and the 
Northern Territory on 1 July 2019.  The Commission will commence operation in 
Western Australia on 1 July 2020.   
 
2.  Sociocultural risks are risks that pose a political threat to the well-being of society 
as a whole, or a particular group within society.  Political risk refers to risks that 
threaten the political legitimacy of the government of the day, or the legitimacy of the 
whole political system.  Sociocultural risks often generate political risk.  A third type 
of risk is actuarial risk that refers to the possibility of harm arising out of an unwanted 
event (Haines 2017: 183-5).  
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